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THE DESIGN OF A CREDIT COOPERATIVE
WITH THEORY AND A TEST 1
Abihijit Banerjee
Timothy Besley
Timothy Guinnane

Abstract
Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less econom
ically developed economies is profoundly influenced by non-firm eco
nomic institutions. However, our theories of non-firm institutions often
suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy.
This paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative
theories using data from German credit cooperatives from the nine
teenth and early twentieth century Germany. We build a model of
credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test
this using nineteenth century data.
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I. Introduction
Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less developed economies is
influenced by non-firm economic institutions such as credit cooperatives, share-cropping
(Stiglitz [1974]), market interlinkages (Braverman and Stiglitz.[1982]), rotating savings·
and credit associations (Besley, Coate and Loury [1993]), gift exchange arrangements,
and the extended family. However, while an extensive body of literature has gone
into understanding the way in which firms are organized ( see, for example, Williamson
[1975]) our understanding of non-firm institutions is limited to a number of alternative
theories about the possible function served by a particular institution. (An exception is
Eswaran and Kotwal [1985]). These theories are all plausible but imply different answers
to policy and other questions. In this paper we illustrate a method for discriminating
between them, using the example of Germany's nineteenth-century credit cooperatives.
There are three main reasons why cooperatives might function better than con
ventional banking arrangements in less developed economies. The first, essentially
sociological, view stresses the role of the community in sustaining non-opportunistic
behavior among participants. Social sanctions are typically not available to a conven.-., :~tional bank,'but are available in a coop (Besley and Coate[1992]). The ·second view sees
the cooperative as sustained by repeated interactions among the participants. Both of
these views are similar in giving reasons why privately optimal, short-sighted behavior
may be curtailed in a credit cooperative. The policy implications of these two views
are also similar: cooperatives should be designed to ensure that members have durable
1

long-term relations among themselves or else identify sufficiently with the collective.
Thus we treat these two as a single hypothesis, which we call the long-term interaction
view of credit cooperatives.
We compare this with the hypothesis that a cooperative-provides an efficient way
to induce monitoring of borrowers which, following Stiglitz [1990], we call the peer
monitoring view. 2 Although the community lacks capital, necessitating outside funding
from a bank, neighbors are assumed to have better information about borrowers than
banks. The efficient outcome is then to have community-based monitoring, an idea first
analyzed in Varian [1989] and Stiglitz [1990]. For such monitoring to be effective, the
cooperative's structure must create incentives for its members to monitor one another.
This view thus predicts that a cooperative will adopt a constitution that provides
monitoring incentives. Here, we suggest three ways in which this can be done:
i) The other members of the cooperative may be made liable, in whole or in part, for
any loan on which the cooperative defaults.
ii) Part of each loan may be financed by another cooperative member, so that if the
borrower defaults, then the other coop members also lose something.
iii) The interest on the part of the loan financed by other members may be increased,
enhancing the members-,·stalfom ensuring that the·loan is repaid.
Our model is of a Principal (the bank), Supervisor (the non-borrowing coop mem
ber), and an Agent (the borrower). While such models have been studied in general (see
Tirole [1988)), we use the German cooperatives as a template for restricting the model,
giving us a basis for characterizing the optimal organizational form. The model is also
2

of interest in the context of the burgeoning literature on non-market credit institutions
reviewed in Besley [1993). Liability, borrowing from inside and the interest paid to
members are the three instruments that are optimally chosen by each cooperative.
Although the data from nineteenth century Germany are not extensive enough
to permit formal statistical testing of hypotheses, they are invaluable for the current•··
exercise. The choice of instruments in Germany was made at the cooperative level,
making it possible for the constitution to reflect optimally its idiosyncratic environment.
The long time-horizon for the data also make it likely that each cooperative adopted
its best constitutional form. In Ireland, the life of the cooperatives was short reflecting
poor institutional design (see Guinnane [1994]).
Our test of the peer monitoring view has two main limitations. First, we have
no direct evidence on the optimality of the chosen instruments. Instead, we derive
the comparative-static properties and compare these to cross-sectional data on cooper
atives. Second, the long term interaction and peer monitoring views are not inconsistent.
Hence, finding that the predictions of the peer monitoring model agree with the data
does not necessarily prove that this is the correct model. We can only find evidence
against this view by finding that its comparative statics do not fit the data.
· The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. ·In sections II-IV we construct a
0

model of the optimal credit cooperative and derive some predictions from it. Section V
tests these predictions against the data on the nineteenth century cooperatives. Section
VI contains concluding remarks.

3

II. The Model
The model is based on the structure of the German cooperatives. Although our
representation is inevitably stylized, the structure of the model captures the salient
features of the institutions. We discuss the correspondence between the model and
historical cooperatives briefly at the end of section III and in detail in section V.
The cooperative has two members each of whom owns two assets -

a plot of land

and monetary wealth of k. At the beginning of time, nature endows (only) one coop
member with an opportunity to make his land more productive. This requires an invest
ment of I< + k units of capital, thus necessitating a loan if it is to be undertaken. The
other member is assumed to have no opportunity to invest and receives a deterministic
return of O on his land. We assume that k < I<, implying that total monetary wealth
within .the coop is insufficient to finance the investment. Thus some part of the loan
must be obtained from outside sources. The cooperative borrows b from outside and
the monitor lends J( - b to the borrower. We denote the interest rate to be paid on
outside funds by Rand on inside funds by r. 3
The non-borrowing member serves three potential functions. First, he is a lender.
Second, he is a guarantor and hence may stand liable if the borrower fails to repay
some of what is owed to the outside borrower. We denote the amount of this liability
by R(~ bR). Finally, he may monitor the borrower.
Once funds for the project are in place, the non-borrower chooses his monitoring
level to affect the borrower's project choice. The. borrower selects a project, whose
4

return is subsequently realized. If he has sufficient funds, then the borrower repays the
monitor and the outside lender. Otherwise, he defaults and the monitor has to pay out

I!..
The monitor can also earn a return on his monetary wealth outside the coop. He
has access to an outside opportunity on which he receives a gross return of p. However,
the net return is p- 6, where 6 can be positive or negative in general. A positive 6 might
represent the fact that the cooperative is a more convenient repository for funds, while
a negative value of 6 represents a case in which the outside bank yields other services

(e.g. advice) unavailable in the coop. Since the borrower may default, the return to
lending inside the coop must compensate the non-borrowing member for the risk that
he bears. Thus, r must be at least as high as the non-borrower's opportunity cost of
funds allowing for the possibility of default. The cooperative's constitution is defined in
terms of (b, I!., r)- the amount of internal borrowing, the liability of the non-borrowing
member and the interest rate paid on internal borrowing.

III. Project Selection
Projects are selected by the borrower but can be influenced by the non-borrowing
member. This section characterizes this project choice as a function of ( b, I!., r). Projects
are indexed by a success probability:
probability

E( 1r)

1r

1r

E

far., l].

A project yields some return with

and nothing otherwise. The expected return from a project is denoted by

= 1r</>(1r ).

We assume that E'( 1r) > 0 and </>'( 1r) < 0. The first of these says that

projects with higher expected returns are also safer.
Let p denote the lender's opportunity cost of funds. The interest rate paid on
5

outside funds in a competitive credit market is found using the lender's zero profit
condition:

1rRb+ (1 - 1r)f = pb.

(1)

With'proba:bility 1r the loan is repaid and with probability (1 - 1r} the lender receives
an amount f from the non-borrowing member. The cost of funds is pb. Solving for R
in (1 ), the total interest payment owed on any project is

(2)

r

= bR + (K -

b)r

= (pb- (1 -

1r)f + (K - b)r1r)/1r,

which is just the sum of repayments on borrowing from outside and inside sources. To
capture the idea that the borrower will choose projects that are too risky from a social
point of view, we assume that

(3)

is decreasing in 1r. Thus if he could borrow at the outside lender's opportunity cost of
funds, p, the borrower would find it worthwhile to choose the riskiest project 1r. This
would be inconsistent with the lender breaking even, necessitating a higher interest rate.
The lender prefers a high 1r while the borrower prefers a low one.
The non-borrowing can affect the project choice. We model this as a penalty
imposed on the borrower if he chooses
be preferred to choosing

.1[

.1[.

Thus, for a project 1r to be selected, it must

and paying the penalty c. The borrower will select the
6

project

1r,

therefore, if it satisfies the following incentive compatibility constraint:

(4)
The monitor chooses c and, we assume, is' committed to punishing the borrower if he
deviates to

1[.

This abstracts from two problems. First, the borrower is not allowed

to bribe the monitor to change his behavior. Second, we ignore the fact that the
punishment may not be credible because it is costly for the monitor to inflict. The cost
of imposing a penalty c, is given by an increasing and convex function, M(c). 4
The monitor is assumed to set c before the borrower chooses 1r. The project chosen
in equilibrium will be that for which (4) is an equality (assuming an interior solution).
But since in equilibrium r depends upon 1r and the vector (b, £, r) via (2), the equilibrium
project can be written as the fixed point relationship:

(5)

1r

= h(r(1r,b,£,r),c),

derived from (4). The value of 1r which satisfies (4) is unique if oh(•)/or • 8r/81f <
which holds if 1r is large enough,5 so that we can write 1r

Ill

= g( b, ,f,, r, c) to represent the

project chosen as a function of the three parameters representing the coop's design and
the penalty level chosen by the monitor.
We now investigate how the choice of

1r

depends upon the cooperative's design,

holding c fixed. (see Appendix A for details). Such effects are mediated through the
interest payment f. Since an increase in the liability on the non-borrower, £, reduces __
the interest rate required by the outside lender, it raises 1r. An increase in r has the
7

opposite effect since it raises r. The effect of changing b depends upon the sign of (R-r);
whether a change in the balance of financing between inside and outi:lide sources raises
or lowers the interest rate depends upon whether inside or outside capital is cheaper.
The monitor chooses c to maximize 1r(J{ - b) - (1-:-- 1r)£ - M(c), recognizing that
1r

is determined by the function h(·). This yields the first order condition:

(6)

oh
((]{ - b)r + £) oc

= M'(c).

The term multiplying oh/8c represents the gain to the non-borrower of the project
being successful over its failure, and thus measures the incentive for the monitor to
increase1r..Solving (6) yields c

= J(b,£,r,1r), i.e.

the penalty choice as functionofthe

coop's design and the project chosen.
To investigate the comparative static properties of (6) there are two effects to
consider (see Appendix A). The first, or direct effect, operates via changes in ((J{ -

b)r + £) and the second, or indirect effect, via the impact of ( b, £, r) on oh/oc operating
through the interest payment

r.

The latter represents how the coop's design affects

the marginal impact of c on project selection. An increase in £ raises the incentive to
monitor directly and also raises oh/oc when it reduces r. Thus more liability increases

c other things being equal. The effect of an increase in r is ambiguous. Its direct
effect encourages monitoring, but it also raises r yielding an unfavorable indirect effect.
Finally, an increase in b reduces incentives for the non-borrower to engage in costly
monitoring if R > r. The direct effect always discourages monitoring and the indirect
effect is also negative if r is increased, which it will be if R > r.
Equilibrium values of c and

7r

are obtained as fixed points of the mappings 1r
8

=

g(b,r,f,c) and c

=

f(b,r,f,1r) (see Appendix A for details). These are denoted by

,c*(b, r,f) and 1r*(b, f, r). Thus project selection and the monitor's choice can be written ,
as functions of the coop's design. This will prove useful in the next section which
'

.

'

investigates how these parameters should optimally be set within a cooperative.
The model makes several specific assumptions that are based on the nineteenth
century German institutions. We discuss a defense of a number of these here. First, we
have ruled out collateral. In doing so, we appeal to the fact that land collateralization
worked imperfectly and that the cooperatives's members were mainly those with few
assets to pledge. In any case, introducing partial collateralization would not change
anything of substance. Second, our assumption that the return on internal funds must
exceed their opportunity cost reflects the reality that cooperative members could use
other financial intermediaries as repositories for their savings if they wished. In reality,
as we discuss further below, the interest rate in cooperatives was most often higher than
that available outside. In any case, it would have been difficult to force individuals to
deposit their savings in a cooperative. Third, we assumed away partial default. As far
as we know, this was treated just the same as full default, leading to ejectment from
the cooperative. This is plausible given that there were probably natural indivisibilities
in punishments such as social ostracism or being ejected from the coop, making the
punishment for partial default much the same as that for full default. While the model
could be extended to handle partial default, it is not clear that there are significant
gains from pursuing this. Fourth, we assume away problems of collusion. We have no
direct evidence that collusion was not a problem, although reference to it never seems
9

to show up in the documents of the time. If anything, the problem of free-riding when
members failed to attend management meetings seemed to be more of a concern.
IV. Optimal Credit Cooperatives
This section studies optimally designed credit cooperatives, i.e., how the parameters

(b,£,r) should be set to foster incentives for monitoring and project selection. We
assume that the objective of the coop is to maximize its ex ante' surplus, given by

V

(7)

= E(n-) -

M(c) - pI< + (K - b)h.

This equals the expected project return less monitoring costs and the opportunity cost
of capital. The final term is the gain/loss if the opportunity cost of funds is different
inside the coop.
There are two agency problems faced by the coop. The first is standard: borrowers may not choose surplus maximizing projects. This may be offset by having a
monitor who can punish the borrower. However, there is a second agency in having
the monitor choose the punishment optimally. The cooperative can specify rules about
borrowing outside, liability and internal interest rates. It cannot, however, directly
specify the choice of project or level of monitoring. Thus, it must respect the incen
tive constraints(4) and (6). An optimal constitution for the credit cooperative involves
choosing (b,£,r) to maximize ex ante surplus, with
We begin by considering what happens if first

1r

and c determined by (4) and (6).

7f'

and c, and then only c, can be

chosen directly as features of coop design. In the first case,

1r

= 1 and c = 0 would

be chosen, since safer projects have the highest expected returns and monitoring is
costly. Whether internal funds are used depends upon whether h~O. Other aspects of
10

the coop's constitution then serve no purpose in affecting its performance.

In the case where c but not 1r can be chosen, the parameters ( b, l, r) can be set to
affect project choice. However, since c can be stipulated, it will be chosen to maximize
(7) yielding

(8)

R'(1r):~ - M'(c)

= 0.

Thus the marginal value of monitoring, which is the increase in the expected profit
project return when c is increased, is set equal to its marginal cost. Some monitoring
is now worthwhile to counteract the incentives of borrowers. The level of monitoring
implied by (8) is not necessarily optimal in the presence of an agency problem in mon.:.
itoring since it ignores the effect of (b, l, r) on project choice via f. However, (8) is a
useful benchmark case to which we return below.
Our exploration of the optimal credit cooperative begins by deriving the first order
conditions for ( b, l, r). The first order condition for b is

(9)
with equality if O < b < K. There are three terms. The first is the effect on project
choice.-This has a direct component (operating through r) and an indirect one operating
through the change in c. The second term represents the effect on costs of changing c.
The third is an effect whose sign depends upon whether internal or external funds have
a higher opportunity cost. The first order condition for liability choice is

(10)

R'(1r)

81r*

of -

oc*
M'(c)a,e?. 0,
11

with equality if O ::S

f

< bR. This basically parallels the case of b, except for the absence

of the final term. The first order condition for the choice of r is likewise:

R'(1r) B1r* - M'(c) Be* ::S 0
8r
8r .

(11)
with equality if r

> (p - 6)/1r, since the cooperative must pay at least the opportunity

cost of funds if non-borrowing members are willing to lend.. Equation ( 11) again displays. ·"
the same two basic terms. We refer to setting r

= (p -

6)/1r and

f

= 0 as the

default

options for these parameters, i.e. to denote situations in which neither of these is set
to foster monitoring incentives.
We begin by looking at how the level of c induced by an optimal constitution
compares with that given by (8). This is answered in:
Proposition 1: The optimally designed coop generates more monitoring than in the

case where c can be directly stipulated. If.(b,f,r) are determined optimally, then the: . . _
monitor chooses a level of c so that the marginal product of monitoring (R1(1r)8g/8c)
is less than its marginal cost (M'(c)).
Proof of Proposition 1: See Appendix B.
Suppose that monitoring were valuable on the margin. Then, since increasing £
increases both c and 1r while reducing

r,

it will be set at its maximum possible value.

The monitor will then owe the bank the interest independently of whether the project
succeeds. At the same time, he will keep the whole of r which ( ex hypothesi) is greater
than E'(1r) which measures the social benefit from monitoring. Thus the private return
to monitoring exceeds the social return.
Proposition 1 is a general result concerning the optimum when a vector ( b, f, r)
12

is being optimally set. We would like, however, to understand each separate aspect of
coop design. Our next set of results illustrates how the three features of the coop design
should be optimally chosen.
The first result is on the choice of r and £. Should the cooperative ever set the
interest rate on internal funds above their opportunity cost? -Proposition,, L suggests-an
immediate answer. Since c is "too high", and increasing r always reduces

1r

and may

sometimes increase c, there is no need to raise r above (p - 6) / 1r unless it will reduce c.
Thus we have:

Proposition 2: If internal funds receive more than their opportunity cost, then the
marginal effect of an increase in r must be to reduce the penalty imposed by the non
borrower.
Proof of Proposition 2: See Appendix B.
The next result concerns the choice between l and r as ways of affecting the choice
of c. Since, from Proposition 1, we know that reducing cat the margin raises ex ante
surplus, we would like to choose parameter values to accomplish this task. We now
compare liability and the interest on internal funds as devices to achieve this. From the
previous result, the effect at the margin of increasing r is to reduce c and
, also reduces both c and
its affect on

r - its

1r

7r.

Reducing l

(by-raising r). However, increasing r only reduces c through -

direct effect is to increase c, whereas both the direct effect and the

indirect effect of reducing l goes in the direction of reducing c. Hence, for a given
reduction in

1r,

reducing l generates a bigger reduction in c than an increase in

long as the reduction in l is feasible it is, therefore, a preferred instrument.
13

r.

As

Proposition 3: If the coop pays the non-borrowing member more than his opportunity
cost of funds, then liability will be set to zero.
Proof of Proposition 3: See Appendix B.
Our final result concerns the effect of having 6 < 0, i.e., a lower opportunity cost
. of funds inside the coop. In this.case, the fonds borrowed by the coop will be entirely
from outside.

Proposition 4: If the opportunity cost of funds is greater outside the coop (h < 0),
then the coop will not borrow at all from its members, but will use the non-borrowing
member as a guarantor (with f, > 0), thus generating incentives for him to monitor.
Proof of Proposition 4: See Appendix B.
The result says that, if there is a better lending deal outside the coop, it will pay
the monitor to place his funds there. In this case, the coop will generate incentives for
the non-borrowing member to commit to punishing the borrower by offering an interest
rate above the opportunity cost of funds. (Note that the Proposition does not say
anything about the case where h

~

0).

This concludes the formal part of the paper. Our next task is to compare the
theoretical predictions of our model with data on the German credit cooperatives in
:-TI:ie Illrieteenth and early twentieth century.

V. A Test
1. Background

German credit cooperatives were founded in the second half of the nineteenth cen
tury under the leadership of Hermann Schulze- Delitzsch and Friederich Raiffeisen, both

14

of whom viewed credit market problems as significant contributors to poverty. 7 While
these two and other leaders differed on many features of cooperative organization, they
agreed that the cooperative's purpose was to make loans to those excluded from banks
and other formal institutions: the poor and those lacking collateral. In this they suc
ceeded. The Raiffeisen organization reported that in 1910, 72.percent of all new .loans
were backed by personal security while 43 percent of all loans outstanding were for 300
Marks or less (Cahill [1913:108-9]). More generally, the credit cooperatives thrived; by
1909 there were over 14,500 rural credit cooperatives with some 1.4 million members,
or about 5.6 cooperatives per 1,000 rural Germans. By one estimate nearly one-third of
all rural German households at the turn of the twentieth century belonged to a credit
cooperative (Grabein [1908:9]).8

2. The German Debate
German cooperators conducted a lively debate over the best structure for a credit
cooperative. This Systemstreit focused especially on liability and the payment of div
idends. Unlimited liability meant that if a cooperative failed, any unsatisfied creditor
could sue any cooperative member for up to the full amount owed to that creditor.
Many Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives adopted limited liability when it became legal in
1889. Dividend policy also divided the cooperative organizations. Raiffeisen-style co
operatives had only nominal shares and paid no dividends to members; any profits
in a business year were placed in a permanent reserve fund. Schulze-Delitzsch credit
cooperatives, on the other hand, had larger shares and paid dividends to members.
Cooperative advocates used both economic and non-economic arguments to support
15

their views of the best cooperative structure. Raiffeisen himself stressed a non-economic
interpretation; to him, limited liability.and dividends were undesirable because they undermined the cooperative spirit. Others, however, took the economic view, and argued
that the basic organizational issues boiled down to practical matters of adapting the
cooperative's constitution to local conditions. The Haas.federation of cooperatives,
which by 1914 ·had admitted the majority of German credit 'Cooperatives, recognized
these practical issues by permitting individual cooperatives to choose their own form
of liability. Because of these differences across German cooperatives, we can test our
c./

model against cross-sectional variations in cooperative structure. Rigorous econometric
tests of these propositions is beyond the scope of-this paper; given the limitations-of -
the,published statistical sources, .that effort requires work with manuscript sources,as ,-.
outlined in Guinnane [1992a,b]. Here we limit ourselves to a discussion of the relation
ship between our model's predictions and aggregate information drawn from published
studies of cooperatives. The data we discuss below are accurate, and pertain to most if
not all credit cooperatives in Germany. Their main defect is that the definitions of the
published data do not always correspond precisely to the variables in our model.

3. Comparing the Results with the Data
The model shows that inoiiitoring will be pushed to a point where its marginal
value"is negative. This result casts different light on one of the proud boasts of the
German credit cooperative movement: their extremely low rate of failure. In 1909-10,
years in which there were approximately 15,000 rural credit cooperatives in Germany,
none of.those with unlimited liability failed, while only.3 with limited liability failed.
16

Viewed comparatively, private credit institutions were 55 times more likely to fail than
were rural credit cooperatives in the period 1895-1905 (Great Britain [1914: 3151).
For some of the relationships implied by the theory, it will prove helpful to supple
ment the analytical results from the last section with simulations.-We study an example
where R(1r)

= 0 + /31r and M(c)- = ac /2. (Appendix C shows that this satisfies neces
2

sary regularity conditions for large enough a). We varied three exogenous variables: the· : ,,,
relative costs of inside and outside capital h, the cost of monitoring a, and a parameter
representing the sensitivity of expected return to the borrower's action, /3. Note that
a higher /3 represents a higher social return for any given 1r, thus parameterizing the
extent of divergence between the private and the social incentives of the borrower.
Table 1 reports the main simulation results. Note that worsening the agency prob
lem, either by increasing a or /3, leads the cooperative to use its incentive instruments
more intensively. For example, as /3 increases from 0.2 to 0.5 liability increases three
fold from 0.2 to 0.6. Increasing 1r reduces the interest rate paid on internal borrowing
significantly. We find that setting the worst available project

1r:.

equal to 0.8 or higher

is needed to get plausible-looking interest rate premia. In light of the relatively rare
failure rate of the cooperatives, this does not seem unreasonable. We return to other
simulation results in the course of discussing specific findings.
The model (Proposition 2) predicts that £ and r would never be set above their
default values together, implying that unlimited-liability cooperatives would charge
lower interest rates to lenders. Published data make it quite difficult to compare £
and r on a cooperative-by-cooperativ e basis. The basic organizational difference does,
17

however, support this prediction.. Schulze - Delitzsch cooperatives paid dividends to
members while Raiffeisen cooperatives did not; in fact, Schulze- Delitzsch cooperatives
were sometimes accused of caring as much about dividends for members as low-cost
loans for members. In the polemics of the day this difference was attributed by the
Raiffeisen adherents to their desire to keep costs low for borrowers. The model implies
something different: given the Raiffeisen commitment to unlimited liability, higher in
terest rates were redundant as an incentive device. In any case, this finding appears
consistent with our theoretical model.
The model, especially Proposition 4, suggests that the sign of S is an important
determinant of whether a liability incentive is used to provide incentives-for the monitor,
with unlimited liability being.more likely when Sis negative. 9 Rural cooperatives were
predominantly of the unlimited liability variety; in 1908, 93 percent of all rural credit
cooperatives had unlimited liability, compared to 54 percent of urban credit cooperatives
(Wygodzinski [1911:60]). Can the sign of Scan explain this?
At first sight, the relative isolation of rural cooperatives would seem to imply that

S was positive. Germany's system of Sparkassen (state-supported savings institutions)
rarely extended beyond cities and towns. Prior to the introduction of a local credit
· cooperative, one authority claimed, savers would keep their money at· home, in d:i:sh,
rather than undertake a long journey to a savings institution (Grabein [1908:54-55]).
Yet, rural credit cooperatives paid an interest rate premium over the Sparkassen one group, for example, paid depositors 3.65 percent on average in 1901, compared
to 3.42 percent for the relevant Sparkassen (Grabein [1908:59]). While this could be
18

explained by the greater risk associated with cooperative deposits, it suggests that 8
is negative. Since both rural cooperatives and Sparkassen almost never failed to honor
their depositors, little of the interest rate premium could plausibly be attributed to
failure risk. The possibility that 8 was in fact negative is reinforced by the observation
that most cooperatives offered a less completerange ofservices to depositors than_would _
··.· be available in a Sparkasse or a commercial bank. Overall, while the limited information·
available suggests that 8 is negative, reaching any firm conclusion on the sign of 8 is
problematic.
The effect of changing 8 on liability choice is investigated in greater detail using
the simulation results reported in Table 2. As Proposition 4 predicts, a negative value
of 8 implies positive liability. As we allow the value of 8 to climb, the liabilitylevel falls.·
There exists a (typically small) positive value of 8 at which the optimal design of the
credit cooperative changes quite dramatically. The cooperative switches from using a
liability incentive to using internal borrowing with an interest rate incentive, as in the
case described in Proposition 2. We pointed out above that reaching firm conclusion
about the sign of 8 is quite difficult. These simulations show that the prediction about
the design of a credit cooperative in the face of varying 8 can be quite dramatic. In
favor of our model, this shows how relatively small differences in 8 could· account for
the significant difference between the urban and rural cooperatives. It could also help
to explain why approximately half of the Schulze-Delitzsch were unlimited liability, and
a few rural cooperatives had limited liability.
The simulations also reveal that raising o: reduces reliance on liability and increases
19

the amount borrowed from within the cooperative. The historical experience is con
sistent with this prediction about a. Some observers argued that differences between
urban and rural environments fully explained the differences between the design of
Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen cooperatives. The Raiffeisen organization reported in
-1913 that 80 percent of their credit cooperatives were located in towns of-3000 or fewer.
persons (Winkler [1933:65]). Urban credit cooperatives tended to be much larger than
their rural counterparts. In 1908 the average urban German credit cooperative had 469
members, the average rural cooperative, 94 members. Several urban credit cooperatives
were enormous; Munich had one with 2600 members (Wygodzinski [1911:80-81]). One
would expect monitoring costs to be higher in urban environments and in larger cooper
atives; cooperative members were.dispersed throughout a town or city and less .likelyto.
come into day-to-day contact. In addition, the projects for which they borrowed were
not so publicly visible as agricultural investments. The Raiffeisen organization insisted
on restricting membership to a small region to maximize the availability of information
on members. Lower monitoring costs, as the simulations demonstrate, encourages the
use of high liabilities. 10 The size of this effect, however, is rather weak. This is consistent
with our intuitive understanding of the model; a change in a changes both the private
- and the socianiiceiftives to monitor, but riot necessarily the wedge·betweenthe private -·
and the social incentives. It is the latter that determines the choice of instruments.
The simulations show that a low

f3 also implies little use of liability while a large f3

encourages the cooperative to use liability to increase monitoring. For high enough (3, we
would expect high liability even with a positive ti. If we were to assume that the agency
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problem is greater in urban areas, then this could also explain the importance of liability
- incentives there. In fact, the predominantly urban Schulze-Delitzsch coops deliberately
discouraged the very poor from joining; only a relatively small number of borrowers
from these limited-liability cooperatives would have so few assets that disappearing
with loan capital would be attractive. Moreover, .they. emphasi~ed short-term loans,
making it more difficult to acquire a large loan intended for a long-term project and
then either misusing it or absconding with the money. The rural cooperatives, on the
other hand, often made small and long-term loans to very poor individuals, people
who might well (in the absence of the cooperative's monitoring) have been tempted to
disappear with a loan, or to choose an extremely risky project.- On the other hand, the
same reasons that made the, cost of monitoring higher in urban areas might also make

/3 higher there.
The model further predicts that r and b are used to provide incentives only if h is
positive. This proposition is the most difficult to test from available data. We have
already referred to the difficulties of signing h empirically, and published information
does not tell us how much of deposits comes from coop members. The cooperatives had
three basic sources of loan capital: loans from outsiders, loans from insiders (that is,
menioer~aeposits), and the' cooperative's own •funds:· Published accounts lumptogether
all deposits (member and non-member alike) and distinguish them only from eigene
Mittel, the cooperative's own funds formed from entrance fees, share capital, and re

tained earnings. The more urban Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives relied relatively more
on their own funds for loan capital. In 1908, of the liabilities of the 12,000 credit coop21

eratives in the Haas organization (primarily rural and unlimited-liability), only about 4
···percent was eigene Mittel. The comparable figure for the 1000 Schulze-Delitzsch coop
eratives was 28 percent (Wygodzinski [1911:139,161:]). Since the eigene Mittel belonged
to the members, and loans made from this source were in a sense loans from insiders,
· the information available tends to suggest that more borrowing from inside went with
a lower value of S, contrary to our prediction. 11
Of the three main propositions suggested by the theory, we conclude that only
one, that liability and interest rate incentives would not be used together, is clearly
supported by the data. The other two propositions are not rejected by the data, but
they are not unreservedly confirmed.
4. Extensions
Here,· we consider some further features of credit cooperatives that may be im
portant in explaining their design. Unlimited liability can also be used as a signaling
device; it may serve to convince lenders that the cooperative was well-run {Buchrucher
[1905:15]). There is some plausibility to this argument given that the unlimited liability
coops in Germany tended to have poorer members who might find it important to signal
that they were responsible. However the very fact that these people are poor, and have
few assets, also tends to lower the credibility of such a signal.
Another explanation of the importance of unlimited liability is based on some co
operatives being poorer than others. We have assumed so far that every coop has the
same ability to borrow from its members, yet poorer coops would find this more dif
ficult, necessitating greater use of liability. This is consonant with the poorer coops
22

borrowing more from outside and explains why the poorer Raiffeisen coops relied on
liability, despite being rural. But for poor members the use of liability is strictly limited
by lack of assets. Thus it would seem that poorer coops would have no effective way of
providing monitoring incentives, implying a higher failure rate. But rural cooperatives
had lower failure rates than urban cooperatives. Another potential weakness of our
model is the absence of risk-aversion. However, if people were highly risk-averse, this
would deter the poor most of all from participating in unlimited liability coops, which
appears contrary to the evidence.
One assumption that it would be desirable to relax is that the cooperative max
imizes total surplus. This.assumption permits us to. derive tight implications in .this
first analysis of credit cooperatives, but should be relaxed in further research. It is
most natural where coop .members are identical, since then maximizing the total sur
plus also maximizes the return to each participant. However member heterogeneity in
both wealth and need for funds was a real feature of cooperatives (Guinnane {1992b]).
Differences in borrowing probabilities or in wealth would require substantial alterations
in om stylized model to maintain to participation by members.
Raiffeisen-type cooperatives, which emphasized high liability, were problematic for
sufficiently heterogeneous populations. One observernoted that in ·some of the limited ··· "
liability cooperatives in Pomerania, one member might have shares worth 100 Marks,
while another had many shares totaling 20,000 Marks. If the latter bore all responsibil
ity, as they effectively would in an unlimited-liability structure, then the wealthy would
be unlikely to join (quoted in Grabein {1908:13, note l]). Rural, unlimited-liability
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cooperatives were in fact relatively uncommon in the Prussian provinces of Saxony and
·-- Pomerania, two areas with considerable numbers of very large farms. When the Irish
Agricultural Organization Society introduced credit cooperatives into Ireland in 1894,
it unfortunately chose to adhere strictly to the Raiffeisen model. Irish credit cooper
atives never succeeded, with some observers. pointing to.the unwillingness of the.more.
prosperous to join an institution in which they would shoulder most of the liability. 12

VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper constructs a simple model of an optimal credit cooperative. Using
the historical German experience, we have examined some implications of the peer
monitoring view of credit cooperatives. We find qualified support for this model in the
· data. However, there are some features of credit cooperatives that we have not addressed
- - , in our.-.work an:d require some furtherinvestigation . .Of the extensions that we.discussed
above, introducing heterogeneity in the cooperative's membership is perhaps the most
important, along with building detailed models of the long-term interaction view to
compare their predictions with the data.
Apart from the specific task of understanding the design of credit cooperatives,
our paper also emphasizes the use of comparative static predictions to ·explore the
orgarnzatiori. of non-standard institutions. We- argued that .it is not ·enough·for""' our_ ·
model to be consistent with the existence of credit cooperatives; the way in which the
organization adapts to different economic environments must also be as theory would
predict. This is a stiffer test of both the theory and the data than is most often used.
However, it is a challenge that is worth facing in trying to make sense of the reasons
24

behind different organizational forms.
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Appendix A
Here, we justify some assertions made in the text. First recall that

(12)

from equality in (4) where

l

= (b,£,r).

We then write 1r

= g(l,c).

The choice of c

satisfies

ah

((K - b)r + £) ac (l,c)

(13)

from which

C

=

= M'(c),

f(l,1r). A pair (1r,c) constitutes an equilibrium if

C

e,

=

f({,1r) and

1r = g( c). They will be differentiable functions of { in the relevant domain if of/ 01f ·
' 8g/ 8c < 1. To calculate the derivatives of these functions, define

n = M'(c){E'(1f) -

(14)

r} 2 > 0,

then, using (13), we have

(15)

(16)

of_ {(E'(1f) - r)r - (£ + (K - b)r)(R- r)}

n

{)b

of_ -{(E'(11")-r)-(f+(K-b)r)(l-1r)/1r}

a.e -

n

and

(17)

of_ -(K - b){(E'(1f) - r) - (£+(I< - b)r)}

or -

n
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>

For the function g(·) we use equality in (4) to derive:

(18)

og
8c

. -l

= {E (1r)- f} · {1 -8h/81r} > O,
1

(19)

(20)
and
(21)

Appendix B
Proof of Proposition. 1: Suppose not, then E'(1r)8g/oc·- M'(c) > O.___ Jt is
easy to check that this implies that (10) is strictly .positive for all £ and hence that

£=Rb. In that case 8r/81r = 0 and 8g/8c = 8h/8c. From (6) we thus have M'(c) =
(r(I< - b) + pb)oh/oc = roh/oc > E'(1r)8h/8c = E'(1r)8g/8c, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2: Observe that (11) can be written as
[l-:cl1r]

(22)

(E'(1r)(gr + gcfr) - M'(c)(fr
[1-:cf,r]

(E'(1r)gc - M'(c))

+ 9rf1r)) =

~c; + E'(1r)gr.

If this is positive, then since 9r < 0 (see (21)), we must have oc* /8r < 0 .
•

Proof of Proposition 3: The key to the proof is showing that
that 8V/8£ < 0. First note that
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av/ or ~ 0 implies

and

av log=

(24)

or or

{E'(1r)8g -M'(c)}(8f log)+ {E'(1r)-M'(c)8f }.
8c
or or
8c

Now from (17) and (21 ),

{(E'(1r) - r) + ((I< - b)r + £)}
of 8g
or/ or = - n(1r - 1!:)(E'(1r) - r) · (1 - 8h/81r)

(25)

and from (15) and (19),

(26)
Thus
(27)
which,sinceE'(1r)8g/8c-M'(c) < O,impliesthat ~~/fr>

~~/f/f. Butsince8g/8r < 0

and og/8£ > 0, then 8V/8r 2: 0 implies that 8V/8f < 0, as claimed. But r exceeds
the opportunity cost of funds only if

av/ or

2:0. Hence in that case we must have

fJV/8£ < 0, which implies that£= 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: Since R ::; p/1r (using (1)), then 6 < 0 implies that

r > R, which implies (from (20)) that 8g/8b > 0. Next, observe that

Now suppose that£> 0 and (K-b) > 0. Then we must have

~r /91,; ::; 0 and~~ /f/f ~ 0.

Note that

(29)

of log
ob ob

b)r + £)}.
n(1r -1!:)(E'(1r) - r). (1 - oh/81r)

= {(E'(1r) - r)i"=-; - ((I< 28

Thus

(30)

~r /We, implying that l = 0. Recall
that an alternative way to write the expression for ~r is
But then since E'(1r)89/8c- M'(c) < 0, ~/~ ~

{JV

(31)

-=

{)b

Since the last two terms here are positive, if
I<), then

°;; > 0 at the optimum. Let (b*, r*) be the values of band rat the optimum

(we have already shown that l*

l

~r :s; 0 (required for an optimum with b <

= 0, results in c = 0

b = b* < I<, c

= 0).

Note that the configuration b'

= I<, r = r* and

(there is no incentive to monitor), Yet, at the optimum with

> 0 and

o;;

> 0. So keeping £ fixed at O and r at r*, if there is an

increase in b from b* to I<, then c must first rise and then fall. Therefore, there must
exist a value of b, call it

b, with b> b*, such that the configuration b = b, l = 0, r = r*

generates the same value of c as the social optimum. Since

b>

b*, and 9b > 0, the

resulting value of 1r will be higher than that at the suggested optimum. Also since
h < 0, this will also reduce the cost of capital to the cooperative. Thus the original

choice of parameters at ( b*, r*, l*

= 0) could not have been optimal.

This proves that

b = I< at the optimum and r is also, therefore, effectively redundant. But then we must
have R > 0 at the optimum as claimed.

Appendix C
Here is to show that the example yields well behaved c( ·) and 1r(•) functions. For
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any given value of 7f, we can determine c from

(32)

ac

.e + (I< - b)r
= -----'------'-----.
(pb- l)/1r + (I< - b)r - /3

The choice of 1r is determined from

c = (1r - 1r){(pb- l)/1r + (I< - b)r - /3}.

(33)

Thus we are looking for a fixed point of the map:

(34)

7f

= -7f + a {.e + (I< -

l

+ (I< -

b)r
b)r - f3 + (pb - .e)/ 1r }2 .

,,Now at ,7f. = K, theright hand side of (34) exceeds the left hand side. Moreover, the
right hand side of (34) is increasing in 1r. Thus we have a fixed point provided that

(35)

l-1r>----.e_+-'-(J1_1_-_b~)r_ _ __
a{l+(I<-b)r-/3+(pb-l)/1r}2'

. h ho ld s I"f a IS
. 1arge enough . It
wh IC

·11 b e umque
.
·rI

WI

2{t+(K-b)r](pb-t)1r
a{[t+(K-b)r]-.0+(pb-t)/1r}3

< 1, wh.ICh

also holds for large enough a. Hence, for large enough a, we have a unique fixed point
between 7f and 1. Thus, 1r will be a differentiable function of (b, r,P), as required.
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2

That monitoring is an important aspect of cooperatives is succinctly captured in

Fagneux [1908]. He refers_ to the small villages as places "where one's eyes. are so
attentive to what occurs among the neighbors", page 39 (authors' translation).
3

We assume that 0 > R to ensure that the non-borrower's wealth is greaterthanthe ..

maximum amount that he could be required to pay to the outside lender.
4

The penalty is never actually imposed in equilibrium. We assume, however, that

it is costly for the non-borrowing member of the coop to put himself in a position to
penalise if necessary. Costs of imposing penalities may thus partly reflect information
gathering, but also the fact that a monitor may have to re-arrange his affairs to watch

-over the

borrower at·crucial ·stages-of the ··project: .,Because there is only "one monitor;·,_·

there is no free-rider problem in monitoring here, which may arise for large coops.
5

Proof: Note that oh/fhr

= {(1r -

'!L)or/81r}/(E'(1r) - r)

£) / 1r(r - R'(1r)}. Since the first term in {·} goes to zero as 1r
in {·} is bounded, the claim follows.
34

= {(1r -t

'!I)/1r} · {(Rb-

1 and the second term

were much more likely to be located in large population centers. The membership of
the Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives in 1912 included 28 percent farmers or farm labor
ers (Great Britain (1914: 311]. The greater occupational heterogeneity in a Schulze
Delitzsch cooperative would also imply a larger a, since it would be more difficult more
urban workers to screen and monitor agricultural projects and vice versa.
11

A long article in Blatter fiir Genossenschaftswesen 1904 (50), the organ of the

Schulze-Delitzsch group, criticizes reliance on deposits in the Raiffeisen organization.
12

One of the few successful Irish credit cooperatives in the early twentieth century

had limited liability. See Guinnane [1994].
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6

The idea is that either member of the coop has an equal probability of being the

borrowing or non-borrowing member at the time at which the coop's constitution is
being designed.
7

Verein fur Socialpolitik [1887] is a survey of rural credit conditions in most of

Germany. Bonus and Schmidt [1990] is·orre of the few papers discussing the German
cooperatives.
8

20 Marks

= 1 pound sterling = $4.86 under the gold-standard exchange rates.

An

unskilled German laborer would earn in the neighborhood of 10-20 Marks per week in
the first decade of the twentieth century. Cooperatives data from Deutsche Bundesbank
[1976: DI,Tables 1.07 and 1.08]. Rural population of Germany for 1910, and defined
as persons in places with fewer than 2,000 people; source is Marschalk [1984:Tables
1.3 and 5.5]. We do not discuss two related features of German credit cooperatives.
Most cooperatives had accounts at regional cooperative banks that aided in smoothing
correlated shocks across cooperatives. In addition, some. credit cooperatives were closely
allied to purchasing and marketing cooperatives. The latter alliances were the subject
of controversy.
9

The parameter b is positive (negative) if the'cooperative is a better (worse) place ··

for local savers to keep their funds.
10

Some agriculturalists belonged to Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives and some town

dwellers belonged to Raiffeisen-style cooperatives, but Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives
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Table 1
Summary of Simulation Results
Exogenous
parameters

Function
value b

Interest
premium c

Scaled
cost of
monito~.ing

a

1t

at
opt

Optimal values for
policy variables
b

d

f3 =

0.01

a=5,3=0.03

33.91

-0.001

0.92

0.927

0

a=5

33.59

0.010

0.96

0.900

0.01

a=5, x=0.5

33. 77

0.004

0.95

0.515

0

0.902

0.2

2

2

f3 =
a=20

39.86

0.006

1.38
2

0.98

1.37

0.2

0.02

f3 =

0.10

0.5

Baseline

52.31

0.129

0.20

0.910

0.6

3=0.03

54.20

-0.021

2.49

0.936

0

a=50

52.25

0.55

0.005

0.903

0.52

2

2

f3 =

0.09

0.13

0.8

a=lO0

68.49

0.007

0.10

0.904

0.85

a=lO0,
3=0.03

72.35

-0.008

6.93

0.911

0

0.12

0.01

3=0.03

71.55

-0.037

2.93

0.953

0

0.07

0.19

a=lO0, 3=0

68.49

0.010

0.10

0.904

0.85

Source:

2

Author's calculations.

=

a.

Unless otherwise indicated, a= 20, 8 = 1, .!. = 0.9, p
= -0.03.

b.

The function maximized is equation (7) with the example provided in
subsection 5.3. Function value reported at l00*exp(U).

c.

Scaled monitoring cost - 100arn2 /2(8 +

d.

Interest premium=

e.

When b=2, r is meaningless.

(p - 5)/7t.
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l31t).

0.05, K = 2, 5

Table 2
Simulation Results: the Effect of
Exogenous
parameters

o

Optimal values for
policy variables

a

b

p
= 0.001
6 = 0.002
6 = 0.003
6

0.98

2

0 .17

1.28

1.21

0

1.27

1.05

0

1.24

1.2

0.01

0

1.24

1

0.002

1

p=
6

= 0.005

o
6

=

O. 8 .•

Source:

0.9

2

Author's calculations.

=

a.

Unless otherwise indicated, a= 20, 8
1, 1£ = 0.9, p = .05, K = 2.

b.

The function maximized is equation (7)
with the example provided in subsection
5.3. Function value reported at
l00*exp(U).

c.

When b=2, r is meaningless.
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